This paper proposes and estimates a static non-parametric transferable utility model of the marriage market. The model rationalizes the standard interpretation of marriage rate regressions as well as pointing out its limitations. The model was used to estimate US marital behavior in 1971/72 and 1981/82. The estimates show that the gains to marriage for young adults fell substantially over the decade. It also showed that the legalization of abortion had a significant quantitative impact on the fall in the gains to marriage for young adults.
Introduction
Thirty years ago, Gary Becker (1973 Becker ( , 1974 ; summarized in Becker 1981) exposited a transferable utility model of the marriage market. It is the current benchmark model of the marriage market. While implications of his model have been tested and applied, it has seldom been estimated. 2 There are two problems that have to be solved before a transferable utility model of the marriage market can be estimated. First, equilibrium transfers in modern marriages are seldom observed. Second, individuals may differ by age, religion, education, wealth, ethnicity, and so on. Different types of individuals may not agree on the rankings of individuals of the opposite gender as spouses. Thus an empirical model of the marriage market should not impose too much apriori structure on the nature of preferences for marriage partners. However without apriori structure,
it is unclear what can be identified from the data.
To understand the identification problem, consider a society with I types of men and J types of women participating in the marriage market. A type is defined by an age range, ethnicity, education, geographic location and so on. Each individual chooses who to marry or to remain single. For each type of man (woman), there are potentially J (I) preference parameters to characterize his (her) utility from each type of spouse and remaining single. In total, there are as many as 2 × I × J preference parameters.
What is observable to a researcher? In principle, the researcher observes the quantity of each type of men in the marriage market, m i for type i men (I observations), the quantity of each type of women, f j for type j women (J observations), and the quantity of type i men married to type j women, µ ij (I × J observations). So the total number of observables are I + J + I × J. For I, J > 2, the number of observables are less than the number of unknown preference parameters. Thus any behavioral empirical model will need to make identifying assumptions to reduce the number of unknown parameters. 3 To finesse the identification problem, demographers use a reduced form approach in the form of marriage matching functions, to estimate the behavior of the entire marriage market. Marriage matching functions are also a fundamental building block of two-sex models of population growth. 4 A marriage matching function is defined as follows. of the marriage market with strong identifying assumptions. 4 See Pollak 1990a for a state of the art study. 5 Our discussion borrows heavily from the excellent discussions in Pollak 1990b and 1990a. of the vector is denoted by f j . Usually, researchers associate types of individuals with their ages. Let Π be a matrix of parameters. A marriage matching function is an I × J matrix µ(M, F ; Π), whose i, j element is µ ij . Denote the number of unmarried men of type i as µ i0 and the number of unmarried women of type j as µ 0j . The marriage matching function µ(M, F ; Π) must satisfy:
Equations (1), (2) and (3) are accounting constraints. (1) says that the total number of men who marry j type women and the number of unmarried j type women must be equal to the number of available j type women for all j. Similarly (2) says that the total number of women who marry i type men and the number of unmarried i type men must be equal to the number of available i type men for all i. (3) holds because the number of unmarrieds of any type and gender, and the number of marriages between type i men and type j women must be non-negative.
Demographers usually work with matching functions with a zero spillover matching rule:
That is, the number of i, j matches only depends on m i and f j . Schoen's 1981 harmonic mean mating rule, (the current workhorse in demography) given by
where α ij > 0, j α ij ≤ 1, and j α ij ≤ 1, is a zero spillover matching rule. This matching function will satisfy all the accounting constraints, (1), (2) and (3) . While zero spillover marriage matching functions are easy to estimate and use, as Pollak 1990b pointed out, the zero spillover assumption is restrictive. Holding the parameters of the marriage matching function, α ij s, constant, changes in m i and f j where i = i or j = j do not affect µ ij . 6 Demographers have of course recognized the importance of spillover (or substitution) effects in marriage matching function (McFarland 1972; Pollard 1997 ).
The problem is to specify marriage matching functions which include substitution effects and yet remain identified. 7 Another problem with marriage matching functions is that they are mostly specified as reduced form and not derived from a model of the marriage market. It is unclear how they may be used to study the impact of social interventions on the marriage market.
Instead of estimating an entire model of the marriage market, many researchers and policy analysts have used marriage rate regressions to estimate the effects of different interventions on marriage rates. The marriage rate of type j women, ρ f j , is:
A marriage rate regression for type j women is defined as:
where g(.) is usually the linear or log function. While easy to use, there are loose ends. First, the standard interpretation of marriage rate regressions has not been derived. Second, how are the estimated effects from male 6 Marriage rate regressions also suffer from a similar defect. 7 Pollard and Höhn 1993/94 provide the most sophisticated matching function of this kind:
) where a i , b j , and h ij are weight functions that are specified by the analyst. When i and j refer to the ages of the participants, the types of individuals are ordered by age. Using this natural ordering, Pollard and Höhn suggested some plausible weight functions. But if types are also defined by ethnicity, religion and other attributes that are not naturally ordered, then it is difficult to apriori specify the weight functions. But without apriori restriction on the weights, the model is not identified. 8 If individual data is used, then researchers estimate G(X j β), the probability that a type j individual will marry.
and female marriage rate regressions related? That is, a factor which affects the female marriage rate must also affect the male marriage rate. This interdependence is ignored in marriage rate regressions. In two different applications, Angrist and this paper show that the estimated effects of the same factor on marital behavior from male and female marriage rate regressions can be wildly contradictory.
This paper proposes and estimates a static non-parametric transferable utility model of the marriage market. The model produces a simple marriage matching function with spillover effects which will fit any observed cross-section marriage distribution.
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Our marriage matching function has an intutitive normative interpretation. Because of its normative interpretation, it can be used to do policy evaluations which are as easy to do as marriage rate regressions but without the limitations discussed earlier.
There are three conceptual benefits for considering transferable utility models of the marriage market. First, taking individual preferences as given, marriage market clearing equilibrium must satisfy all the accounting constraints, (1), (2) and (3).
Second, the reduced form for equilibrium quantities of a market clearing model do not include prices, i.e. equilibrium transfers. Thus the absence of observable transfers to the researcher may not be a problem.
Third, transferable utility models provide a solution to the identification problem discussed above. To see how the identification problem may be resolved, let the marital output of an i type male and a j type female only depends on i and j. Then there are I ×J number of these marital outputs plus I +J outputs of the types being single. If the behavior of the marriage market is characterized by these outputs alone, then we may be able to estimate all the parameters which are necessary to determine marital behavior.
In particular, we do not have to estimate separate male and female preferences for spouses. A well known property of transferable utility models of the marriage market is that they maximize the sum of marital output in the society (For example, Roth and Sotomayor 1990; Chapter 8). Thus behavior in transferable utility models can be characterized by knowledge about marital output alone, and knowledge about male and female preferences separately is not necessary.
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In this way, we have reduced the number 9 Our marriage matching function also satisfies the conditions in Pollak 1990a, sufficient to generate a well posed two-sex model of population growth. 10 Both Bergstrom and Lam; Suen and Lui used this property in their empirical work. Unlike the objective here to use this property to estimate a just identified model, they estimated tightly parameterized of unknown parameters necessary to determine behavior to the number of observables.
In order to implement the above framework, we use McFadden's (1974) well known extreme value random utility model to generate demand and supply functions for different types of marriages. With our behavioral assumptions, the following marriage matching function is obtained:
The above equation says that the number of i, j marriages is proportional to the geometric average of the unmarrieds of each type. The marriage matching function is homogenous of degree one in M and F .
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Our model of the marriage market provides a normative interpretation to Π ij . The model assumes that the total surplus or payoff from a potential i, j marriage depends on a systematic payoff that is common to all i, j match, and an idiosyncratic payoff related to the two particular potential spouses. Realized i, j marriages generated higher payoffs than other feasible marriages. The higher payoffs may be due to high systematic payoffs related to the i, j match, or high idiosyncratic payoffs, or a combination of the two.
All else equal, matches that are frequently observed imply a relatively high systematic payoff to that pairing while matches that are infrequent have low systematic payoffs.
We interpret Π ij as measuring the systematic payoff to an i, j marriage relative to those types not marrying. The systematic qualifier is important. Π ij does not measure the total (systematic and idiosyncratic) payoff to observed i, j marriages relative to those types not marrying. Our interpretation of Π ij says that the systematic gains to i, j marriages are larger when the number of i, j marriages, suitably scaled, is larger. Scaling is necessary because the number of i, j marriages may be high because there are more type i men and type j women.
An important theoretical antecedent to our work is Dagsvik (2000) .
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A comparison with his work is provided in Section 6.
Using ages as the only types for males and females in the benchmark model, the second part of the paper estimates Π using data from the 1970 and 1980 US Census, and transferable utility models of the marriage market. 11 Pollak 1990a argues that no scale effect is a reasonable requirement for marriage matching functions. 12 Angrist and Evans 1999 showed that the marriage rates of young men and women were lower in early legalizing states relative to later legalization states in the early seventies. We show that the estimates of the number of marriages affected are extremely sensitive to whether we use male or female marriage rate regressions. Using our framework, we show that the partial legalization of abortion in some states can explain up to twenty percent of the drop in the gains to marriage among young adults in the seventies. In doing so, we extend the standard difference in differences estimator to estimate the effect of a policy change on bivariate distributions.
14 It should be clear that the empirical issues discussed here and the ability of transferable utility models of the marriage market to resolve many of these issues are known.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide an elementary parametrization which exploits all the power of this framework.
The model
We begin by describing a transferable utility model of marriage. There are I types of men and J types of women. For a type i man to marry a type j woman, he must transfer τ ij amount of income to her. There are I ×J sub-marriage markets for every combination of types of men and women. The marriage market clears when given equilibrium transfers, τ ij , the demand by men of type i for type j spouses is equal to the supply of type j women for type i men for all i, j.
To implement the above framework empirically, we adopt the extreme value random utility model of McFadden to generate market demands for marriage partners. Each individual considers matching with a member of the opposite gender. Let the utility of male g of type i who marries a female of type j be: 
where ε i0g is also an i.i.d. random variable with type I extreme value distribution.
Individual g will choose according to:
15 The random variable ε ijg ∼ EV (0, 1), with the cumulative distribution given by
We assume that the numbers of men and women of each type is large. 
EV ig is the expected utility of a male of type i before he sees his realizations of his ε ijg for all j. Equation (9) shows that it is proportional to the log of the ratio of the number of available type i men relative to the number of type i men who choose to remain single.
The expected payoff if being single is the only option is given by
) is observable, it measures the expected benefit of a type i male from being able to participate in the marriage market where non participation means only choosing to be single. Let
denote the expected gains to entering the marriage market for a type i male. As shown in the appendix and section 3, the expected gains depends on preference parameters, α ij and α i0 , as well as transfers, τ ij .
The random utility function for women is similar to that for men except that in marriage with a type i men, a type j women receives a transfer, τ ij . Let γ ij denote the systematic gross gain that j type women get from marrying i type men, and γ 0j be the systematic payoff that j type women get from remaining single. The term
is the systematic gross gain that j type women get from marrying i type men relative to not marrying. 16 It is not a demand curve because
Let µ s ij be the number of i, j marriages demanded by j type women and µ s 0j the number of type j women who want to remain unmarried. The quasi-supply equation of type j women who marry type i men is be given by:
Again, the transfers for all the other types of men other than i is embodied in ln µ s 0j . Following (9), the expected gains to entering the marriage market for a type j female is:
There are I ×J sub-marriage markets for every combination of types of men and women.
The marriage market clears when given equilibrium transfers, τ ij , the demand by men of type i for type j spouses is equal to the supply of type j women for type i men for all i, j.
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When the competitive marriage market for all i, j pair clears, the demand for i, j marriages is equal to the supply:
Substituting (12) into equations (8) and (11) to get:
Substituting (13) into (11), we get:
If we let
, we can rewrite Equation (14) as:
which is our marriage matching function.
Equation (15) has an intuitive interpretation. The right hand side of (15) Equation (15) 
Identification
A point estimate for Π ij is given by
. Equation (15) is non-parametric in the sense that it fits any observed marriage distribution. That is, we do not impose any apriori structure on the systematic gains to marriage. However our approach is completely parametric with respect to the idiosyncratic gains to marriage. The marriage matching function is also fully saturated in the sense that there are I × J elements in µ and there are I × J parameters in Π. In order to maintain identification of the marriage matching function, the behavioral restrictions underlying Equation (15) can only be relaxed by imposing other restrictions.
Observing Π ij however, is not sufficient for us to identify the individual specific systematic returns, α ij and γ ij . It is also not sufficient to estimate (α ij − γ ij ), which is needed to identify the equilibrium transfers in Equation (13) . In other words, knowing the systematic gains to a match is not sufficient to determine whether men pay positive or negative transfers to women in equilibrium. On the other hand, in applications where τ ij is also observed, then equations (13) and (15) would allow us to identify α ij and γ ij .
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In these cases, equations (13) and (15) are able to fit any observed marriage distribution and transfer function. So the current model can be used to fit any finite type competitive bilateral matching market if the matching distribution and the equilibrium pricing functions are observed.
In addition to π ij , equations (8) and (11) allows us to identify α ij − τ ij and γ ij + τ ij , that is:
We will refer to n ij as the systematic gain to marriage for a type i male in an i, j marriage relative to not marrying, and N ij as the systematic gain to marriage for a type j female in an i, j marriage relative to not marrying.
Marriage rate regressions and policy evaluations
The expected gain to entering the marriage market for a type j female denoted by Q j , is related to the marriage rate by:
This approximation is accurate for small marriage rates. The marriage rate for type j females is also related to the systematic net gains N ij in (16) according to:
Equation (17) 
, from any particular sample.
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The difficulties with marriage rate regressions discussed in the introduction also remain.
To avoid these difficulties and retain the convenience of marriage rate regressions, consider the following regression model for the total systematic gains to an i, j marriage:
where X ij denote the vector of variables (including policy variables) that affect the total systematic gains to an i, j marriage. u ij is an error term with mean zero and uncorrelated with X ij . Since we can construct π ij from equation (15), we can estimate β in equation (18) .
Policy changes will induce changes in π ij as captured by (18) . Changes in π ij will affect marital behavior via the marriage matching function described in equation (15) .
So given estimates of β, one can predict the effect of changes in X ij on marriage behavior including marriage rates.
Estimating (18) is as easy as estimating marriage rate regressions. So we preserve the advantages of marriage rate regressions for doing policy evaluations of factors which affect the marriage market. Unlike marriage rate regressions, we do not estimate separate sets of regressions for different types of individuals or genders. Thus we will not run into the interpretive difficulties discussed in the introduction with marriage rate regressions.
Also, we do not include the sex ratio as a regressor in (18) . Instead, the section below considers the impact of changes in population vectors on the marriage distribution. 20 Instrumenting the sex ratio does not solve this problem. 
If we take Π ij , M (21) and (22) (19) . To derive this system of equations, we sum equation (19) over all i's to get:
Similarly, summing equation (19) over all j's, we get:
Given population quantities M, F, µ and Π as defined in equation (15) The proof using the implicit function theorem is given in Appendix B.
Limitations
In this section, we would like to draw attention to two limitations of our approach.
The first arise from using the extreme value random utility model of McFadden to model demand. The "independence of irrelevant alternative" limitation on substitution patterns in that model of demand is well known.
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At present, we do not know how restrictive our substitution patterns are on the marriage matching function. However a marriage matching function which allows for spillover effects and remains econometrically identified will need to have strong restrictions on these effects.
Another limitation of our static approach to the marriage market is that it ignores dynamic considerations. In particular, the value of delaying marriage at time t depends on future opportunities for marriage. Future opportunities are related to current pop- A discussion of the results from these specification tests is given in Section 7.3 of the paper.
Dagsvik's model
The marriage matching function in Dagsvik(2000) is defined by
where θ ij are unrestricted. The term θ ij has a similar normative interpretation as our Π ij . His model is also non-parametric and will fit any observed marriage distribution.
Thus given data from a single cross section, we cannot differentiate between his model and ours in terms of fit of the data.
Empirically the two marriage matching functions differ in that Dagsvik's model has scale effects. For the simple case of one type of male and one type of female, it is easy to check that Dagsvik's model satisfies increasing returns to scale in the population vectors.
The two models also employ different specification of payoffs to marriage. In his model, the payoff that male g of type i gets from marriage to female k of type j is defined by:
α ij denotes the systematic return to i type male from an i, j match. ε ijgk denotes the idiosyncratic returns from a match between individual g and the j type female individual k.
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So if he is matched with another female k of type j, he will get a different payoff.
Likewise for the payoffs of the females when they choose between different males. Since individuals in Dagsvik's model value every potential spouse differently, he cannot use price taking behavior (equilibrium transfers) to clear the marriage market. Instead, he uses the deferred acceptance algorithm and stable matching as an equilibrating device.
Stability per se is not the difference between his model and ours because our equilibrium is also stable.
In contrast, our model assumes that for any type j, there are sufficient number of females of that type such that male g is indifferent between them. Likewise for any 22 The random variable ε ijgk is also assumed to have type I extreme value distribution.
type i males, female k has enough males of that type to choose from such that she is indifferent between them. So f j does not directly affect the idiosyncratic payoff that male g gets from choosing to marry a female of type j. Likewise for female k. Given these indifference assumptions about within type spouses, we can use types specific transfers to clear the marriage market. Thus we have a transferable utilities model of the marriage market whereas Dagsvik (2000) has a non-transferable utilities model. Analytically, our model is easier to derive. While there are differences between the two models, we are more similar to each other than other marriage matching functions.
Both matching functions are built from explicit, albeit different, models of the marriage market. We follow his lead in using extreme value random utility functions. Although the available population increased by more than 39% over the decade, there were only 3.45 million marriages in 1981/2, an increase of 6.5%. A summary of the data set is in Table 1 below. Figure 1a and 1b show the bivariate age distributions of the marrieds in 1971/2 and 1981/2 respectively. In both years, most marriages occured between young adults and there was strong positive assortative matching by age.
In Figure 2 , we graph the 1970 and 1980 age distributions of the population vectors.
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For both decades, there are more available men than women in the early ages and the reverse is true in the later ages. These gender differences are due to the fact that there are relatively more widows and the lower remarriage rate of divorced women. The higher remarriage rate of divorced men reduced the availability of younger women. The arrival 25 The average age of available men and women in 1970 were 30.4 and 39.1 respectively. This gender difference reflected the larger fraction of available older women. The average age of the married men and women in 1971/2 were 27.1 and 24.5 respectively, reflecting the usual gender difference in ages of marriage. The statistics for 1980 are similar, as shown in Table 1 .
of the baby boomers to the marriage market in 1980 is readily visible from the increase in the population of the availables. This arrival should have had a substantial impact on the marriage market. However, the number of young marrieds in 1980 barely increased. ) are compared in Figure 3 .
In the 1971/2 and 1981/2 marital records, there were many age pairs which had no marriage. This is a common problem in empirical discrete choice applications and is encountered throughout the empirical section of this paper. We employ kernel smoothers to deal with this thin cell problem. The smoother estimates a function at any age by averaging or smoothing local neighbouring data points. For example the non-parametric estimator of the net gains in 1971/2 from an i, j marriage to a j type female is given by,
where
We used the normal kernel as the kernel weighting function, K(·). The bandwidth for the estimator denoted by b defines the width of the interval over which local averaging takes place.
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For an age pair where zero marriage is encountered, a weighted average of neigbouring points with positive marriages are used to construct an estimate at that point. The non-parametric estimator proposed in equation [24] is standard and discus- receiving the largest systematic net gain when she marries a slightly older male while the 20 years old male receiving the largest systematic net gain when he marries a slightly younger female.
Comparing the distribution of systematic net gain for a 30 years old female, N 71 i, 30 , with her 20 years old counterpart, we find the distribution for a 30 years old female to be more dispersed. Again she receives the largest net gain when she marries someone slightly older. If we consider the distribution for 30 year old males, n 71 30,i , we also find the distribution to be more dispersed than for his 20 year old counterpart. Again his largest net gain is to marrying someone slightly younger.
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Figure 3b compares the systematic net gains to marriage for 40 and 50 years old males and females. We observe that the net gains to marriage fell substantially by age.
The net gains to marriage for 40 old males were higher than for 40 year old females and the marriage rate is also higher. The distribution of net gains to marriage for 40 year old females is similar to that of 50 year old males! Put another way, the age distribution of spouses of 40 year old females in 1970 is similar to the age distribution of spouses of 50 year old males. Finally, the net gains to marriage for 50 year old females were lower than the other groups.
¿From Figure 3 , we also observe that the estimated net gains are negative which reflects the fact that the systematic net gains to marriage is smaller than not marrying. This is not surprising since at any age, most individuals do not marry.
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The behavioral assumption of the model predicts a match to occur only when the match specific idiosyncratic utility is large.
Most of the features of the empirical distributions in Figures 3a and 3b are expected;
What is new is that our model provides a normative interpretation of these empirical distributions. It is important to remember that our estimates of net gains reflect both preferences and equilibrium transfers. 27 According to equations (16) and (17) stated earlier, the area below the transformed net gains, exp(n ij ) and exp(N ij ) is proportional to the type specific marriage rates. Comparing the areas under the respective transformed distributions, the area under exp( n 71 20,j ) is smaller relative to that of exp( N 71 i,20 ) suggesting that the marriage rate of 20 year old females is larger than that of 20 year old males. For 30 year old individuals we observe the converse, that is, the marriage rate for males is higher than his 30 year old female counterpart. These transformed distributions not shown in the current version are available from the authors on request. These qualitative results are also apparent from Figure 4 . 28 n ij > 0 implies µ ij > µ i0 which is counterfactual for all i, j. Figure 4 shows the 1971/2 and 1981/2 marriage rates by age. For both decades, the marriage rates for women are higher than that for men in the early ages and lower in the later ages. Marriage rates for both men and women were noticebly lower in 1981.
Estimating the systematic gains to marriage
The decline in marriage rates was particular sharp for young adults.
Within the context of our model, the marriage rate of a type of individual measures the expected gains to entering the marriage market relative to not entering for that type.
In this light, Figure 4 shows two relevant features. First, the expected gains to entry rise rapidly by age, peak around mid-twenties and then slowly decline with age. The expected gains are larger for young women than men and reverse for older individuals.
Second, the expected gains to entering the marriage market for both men and women fell substantially over the decade. It is clear that a constant total systematic gains to marriage model over the decade cannot fit the data. It should also be clear that any increasing returns to scale marriage matching function, where the marriage rate should have increased over the decade, will provide a even worse fit.
In order to quantify the changes in the systematic gains to marriage over the decade, we first estimate a benchmark model of the marriage market where the type space only consists of the ages of individuals. That is, i = 16, .., 75 denotes the age for men, j = 16, ..75 denotes the age for women, t = 71 and t = 81 denotes the period 1971/72 and 1981/82 respectively. For year t, we estimate the total systematic gains to marriage by:
To deal with the thin cell problem, we employ a non-parametric locally smoothed estimate of π t (·) at any age pair (k, l).
The parameter b denotes the bandwidth and K(·) denotes the kernel weight. Like in the previous application, we used the normal kernel and attempted numerous bandwidth parameters. Figure  1a , the distribution of the estimated total gains are less peaked and less concentrated.
In particular, the total gains are larger off the age diagonal and for older individuals than would be predicted from bivariate marriage distribution of Figure 1a . Like the estimates of the net gains from marriage in the previous section, we observe that the estimated systematic total gains relative to remaining single is also negative. This reflect the empirical fact that most available individuals do not marry. As far as we know, we have just presented the first estimates of the systematic gains to marriage relative to not marrying between any two age pairs for the US.
As discussed earlier, Figure 1a shows the standard result that there is strong positive assortative matching by age. Beginning with Becker, economists have investigated conditions for observing positive assortative matching by traits in the marriage market.
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These investigations assume that if a trait of an individual has a natural ordering, then marital output is increasing or decreasing in that trait. Figure 5 shows that systematic marital output is not monotonic in either male or female ages. Thus the theoretical investigations into the conditions for positive assortative matching do not apply in our context. The rationale for observing positive assortative matching by age in Figure 5 is more mundane. Approximately along the age diagonal, systematic marital output is higher than off the age diagonal. That is, individuals match assortatively by age because they 'suit' each other best! Although not shown, the plot of π 81 ij is qualitatively similar.
Testing model mispecification
A strong implication of our model, as given in equation (15) 31 Most of these investigations implicitly or explicitly focus on income of the participants. Holding other factors constant, the assumption that a spouse with more income is better is natural. We present results from OLS and instrumental variable (IV) regressions. Columns (1) and (2) show OLS and IV results for our model. Columns (3) and (4) show OLS and IV results for Dagsvik's model. In column (1), the 1970 female population vector can still explain variations in π 71 ij even after controlling for demographics (using a ninth order polynomial in ages). This result suggests that π 71 ij is possibly correlated with the population vectors in 1970, a violation of our model. The estimated negative coefficient however suggests that this correlation could also be induced by measurement error in population vectors. In the IV regression (column (2)), the correlation between 32 We also estimated models where the observations are weighted by the geometric average of the population vectors, and with median regressions. The results are similar to those obtained here.
our estimate of preferences and population vectors become statistically insignificant.
However, given the large standard errors, it is premature to conclude that there is no model mispecification.
The results for Dagsvik's model in columns (3) and (4) are similar to what we found for our model. In fact in the OLS results (column (3)), the estimated coefficients for both population vectors are statistically different from zero. Thus there is some marginal evidence to prefer our model to his. The evidence in Table 2 does not support the hypothesis that scale effects are quantitatively important in the US marriage market in the early seventies.
8 Drop in the gains to marriage We explored two factors which may have caused the fall in the total gains to marriage.
First, in an earlier draft of this paper, we expanded the type space to include three levels of education (less than high school, high school graduate and college graduate). College graduates delay marriage relative to non-college graduates. We expected more adults to have obtained college degrees in 1980. So if we account for educational attainment, we may be able to explain part of the drop in the gains to marriage. Introducing educational attainment in an expanded type space significantly improved the fit of the model. Nonetheless, we were still unable to account for most of the estimated drop in the gains to marriage among young adults over the decade. The reason why including educational attainment did not explain the drop is shown in Figure 7 . While the fraction of adults who have a college degree in 1980 was much larger than in 1970, the increase was concentrated among older adults. Among adults younger than 25 years old, there was essentially no difference in college attainment between 1970 and 1980. Thus educational attainment did not play a large role in affecting the drop in the gains to marriage among young adults over the seventies.
Legalizing abortion and the fall in the gains to marriage
Technological innovations and social changes like the invention of the pill and the legalization of abortion in the seventies has affected the gains to marriage by changing the opportunites available to women. In this section, we explore the role of differential access to legal abortions across states in the seventies in affecting the gains to marriage. In order to empirically study the impact of the partial legalization of abortions on the gains to marriage, consider an expansion of the type space of individuals. A type of an individual is now defined by his or her age, whether the individual lives in a reform state (r for male and R for female), or non-reform state (n for male and N for female), and time, t. We will use the convention s and S to denote the states of residences for a male and female respectively, where s ∈ {r, n} and S ∈ {R, N }. We assume that all individuals at time t, living in a reform state or otherwise, are available to other individuals at the same time t in one national marriage market. So an individual living in a reform state at time t may marry someone living at same time in either a reform 33 Akerlof, et. al. 1996 argued that the legalization of abortion may substantially reduce the gains to marriage. Also see Goldin (26) We use the notation D to denote dummy variables and h(x) to denote some general 
Then a non-parametric estimator of h R t (k) at age k is given by,
The function K(·) is the kernel weights and b is the appropriate bandwith for the estimator. A similar estimator can be constructed for age i males.
The systematic gains to marriage can be parameterized in a similar manner. Let the marriage gains to an age i male living in state s with an age j female living in state S at time t, π sS ijt , be given by:
The notational convention adopted in equation [26] Our model for the systematic gains to marriage in equation [29] has some advantages over the marriage rate formulation in equation [26] . First, the formulation using the systematic gains satisfies all the restrictions of a marriage matching function while the marriage rate models of the form in equation [26] 
Similarly, we can define a non-parametric estimate of g rR 71 (·, ·) at any age combination
Note the similarity between ∆ , j) , and state pair (s, S) rather than for male or female ages alone, it is as easy to estimate as equation [27] .
Data:
Using information on the place of residence from the US Census, and the marriage records from the Vital Statistics, we classify the data described in Section 7 according to whether the place of residence of an individual is a reform or non-reform state. Table   3 provides a summary of the data used.
The sample of available males and females on the marriage market from the nonreform states is considerably larger than that of the reform states. The increase in the population observed over the decade in the two groups of states also differ in magnitude.
In the reform states, the population of available males and females increased by 50.4 % and 54.6 % respectively, compared to a more modest increase of 38.2 % and 30.7 % for available males and females respectively in the non-reform states. The average age of males and females in the two groups of states are comparable to the numbers of the entire sample reported in Table 1 . We also see a small increase in the gains to marriage for same age spouses, between the ages of 27 to 40. An explanation of these gains is that these are young individuals who would have gotten married young had abortion not been legalized. This social change allow these individuals to delay marriage to an older age.
We interpret the effects displayed in Figures 8 and 9 as due to the partial legalization of abortion on marriage rates and the gains to marrage. The standard DD argument for identification is based on the claim that the policy intervention of interest generates year and location specific interaction effects that would otherwise not be there. In addition to the standard argument, we also expect partial legalization to affect young adults more than older adults which is consistent with the evidence in Figures 8 and 9 .
In order to quantify the effect of the partial legalization of abortion on marriage rates, we use the two estimators, ∆ Using the counterfactual marriage rates in the non-reform states and the observed rates in the reform states, we construct an aggregate male and female marriage rate in the scenario where there was no differential access to abortion in 1971/72.
A comparable counterfactual marriage rate can be constructed using the DD marriage gains estimator. We first estimate g rR 71 (i, j), g rN 71 (i, j), and g nR 71 (i, j) according to equation [30] . Using these estimates, we construct gains to marriage in the non-reform states in the counterfactual scenario that abortion was partially legalized in these states in 1971/72. suggests that 20% of the observed fall in the 22 35 Non-reform states went from no legalization to full legalization between 1970 and 1980. This change can be conceptually decomposed into (1) no legalization to partial legalization, and (2) partial legalization to full legalization. We are asking how much of the change in marriage rates over the decade can be attributed to the conceptual change from no legalization to partial legalization. 
Conclusion
This paper proposed and estimated a non-parametric transferable utility model of the marriage market. The model was used to estimate US marital behavior in 1971/72 and 1981/82. The estimates show that the gains to marriage for young adults fell 36 The total number of recorded marriages in 1971/72 is 3,235,806. 37 While smaller, significant disparity remains if we limit ourselves to marriages for individuals less than age thirty.
substantially over the decade. The legalization of abortion had a significant quantitative impact on the fall in the gains to marriage.
We discuss some avenues for future research. First, we need to understand better the substitution effects in this model.
Second, we considered a static model of the marriage market. A dynamic transferable utility model of the marriage market is needed. This research is currently in progress.
Third, an issue that arises in modelling dynamic marriage market models with search frictions is the specification of the meeting technology. Fourth, we ignored cohabitation in this paper. Methodologically, cohabitation is easy to incorporate. Cohabitation is another type of match in the marriage market.
The reason why we ignored cohabitation in the current empirical analysis is because we cannot calculate the number of new entrants into cohabitation from census data. 11 Appendix A
The derivations of (8) and (9) are known and included here for completeness.
11.1 Derivation of (8) (5) may be rewritten as
As specified by (7), g solves
The probability that a type j woman is chosen is:
The index k runs from 0 to J. 
When there are many men of each type, we may approximate Pr{V ig = V ijg |η} with µ ij m i
. Then (8) follows from (33).
Derivation of (9)
The index k runs from 0 to J. Observing male g of type i choose choice j, the expected utility of that individual is: 
which is independent of j. Since knowing the optimal choice of the individual is not informative about his expected payoff, EV ig = EV ijg . Then (35) and (8) imply: (36) which is (9).
Appendix B
To apply the implicit function theorem to the system (21) and (22), we need to show that the Jacobian of the system is non-singular. The Jacobian is: To maintain consistency between states reporting marriages to the Vital Statistics and the data collected from the respective US Census, some states to be excluded. This result in the data from the following states being used: Alabama; Alaska; California The age range studied was 16 to 75 years of age. Education level was identified using the "higradeg" variable in the 1970 and 1980 samples. This variable allowed us to assign each person one of the following schooling types: less than highschool, highschool graduate, and college degree or more.
We use the "marst" variable in the census to identify a person as either: never married, currently married (spouse present), or previously married (divorced or widowed).
Further, the "marrno" variable (in 1970 and 1980 datasets) allows us to distinguish between married individuals in their first marriage and individuals in their second or later marriage.
To calculate the number of unmarried individuals of each type, we simply collapse the census data into counts by type. The process is straightforward and we don't loose any observations along the way.
